The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law
J. Harvie Wilkinson lIlt
Accountability in our government must run ultimately to the
governed. In the federal judicial branch, however, it does not run
directly to the governed, because judges are neither placed in office
nor removed from office by the electorate. The link from the judicial community to the governed must therefore be otherwise established. If not accountable to the electorate itself, federal judges
must be answerable to the electorate's will as expressed through
law. The possessor of no popular mandate, the judiciary enjoys
only derivative authority, acquired through the mandate of the
law. The legal universe is the handiwork of others: judge-made law,
as such, has no place.
The role of the judge involves, first and foremost, an unstinting effort to apply the law as written. In a perfect world, elected
representatives would draft laws of supreme clarity and judges
would not disturb the indisputable meaning of legal texts. In our
fallen world, however, law requires interpretation. Constitutional
clauses are not shining models of clarity, but only the conveyors of
clues and suggestions of intent. Statutes themselves are often
vague and preambular in nature: the National Labor Relations
Act,1 the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934,2 the Sherman Act,3 and
the Reconstruction-era civil rights laws 4 have had layers of judicial
flesh placed on the barest bones of congressional language. Even
laws of legendary specificity, such as the Internal Revenue Code,
have left interstitial questions unaddressed. Moreover, absolute
clarity may not even be an object of Congress, which depends in
passing legislation, upon the art of compromise. The lack of clarity
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on the part of those who make laws engenders suspicion of those
who must interpret them. That unelected judges have been left to
interpret the equivocal will of elected representatives must sometimes seem the final measure of our government's fall from grace.
What gives the judiciary the right to undertake this formidable task of interpretation? Interpretation has been called "the process by which a judge comes to understand and express the meaning of an authoritative legal text and the values embodied in that
text."' For this task, the rule of law may provide guidance but no
answer. Why, then, should the judge's answer merit public
acceptance?
In this essay I examine the justifications for-and constraints
upon-the judge's interpretivist function. The limits of the judicial
function can best be understood by inquiry into the ways judges
can be held accountable and the ways they cannot. I work from
two premises: First, that judges are subject to the law, not above it.
Second, that being subject to the law does not reduce the art of
judging to an act of ritual intonation, uninformed by faculties of
reason that elucidate the meaning of legal texts. Clearly, the framers of our Constitution contemplated something other than direct
electoral accountability for judicial acts. The rule of law, as elucidated by the force of reason, fills that gap.
To be a judge is to exercise judgment, and some measure of
what Justice Frankfurter called "creative power" is a legitimate
and necessary part of the job.7 That word "creative," however,
must be closely watched. It implies the fashioning of new rules
rather than the interpretation of existing ones. It conjures images
of judges whose ideals and imaginings may get the better of them.
Judicial restraint must place some bounds on the creative power.
The level of public comfort is rightly higher with technicians than
with dreamers on the bench.
Judicial reason and restraint, however, can be complementary
concepts. Justice Frankfurter, the second Justice Harlan, and,
more recently, Justice Powell have attempted to reconcile the two.
By locating principles of restraint in the constitutional framework
of government, each Justice avoided the extremes of thoughtless
literalism and heedless idealism alike.
The contributions of these Justices form a potentially important, but curiously absent, part of the present debate over judicial

6 Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 Stan L Rev 739, 739 (1982).
7 Felix Frankfurter, Twenty Years of Mr. JusticeHolmes' ConstitutionalOpinions, 36
Harv L Rev 909, 911 (1923).
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accountability and judicial activism, a debate that culminated in
the nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court. That debate
highlighted two divergent views that alternatively would expand
the "creative power" beyond all acceptable limits or would deny it
altogether. To build upon that debate, one must first analyze judicial accountability, not by focusing solely on the differences between election and appointment, but by exploring the ways in
which the judiciary is and is not accountable in its interpretative
function. One may then appreciate how the work of Justices
Frankfurter, Harlan, and Powell reflected the relationship between
judicial accountability to reason and judicial commitment to
restraint.
This article attempts to explore that relationship. In the first
section of this essay, I discuss the unaccountable dimension of judicial power. In section II, I explore those concepts of judicial accountability that seem to me ultimately inadequate as justifications for judicial authority. Section III addresses the necessity of
judicial accountability to legal reason; section IV, the place of legal
reason within the federal judicial system. Finally, drawing on the
tradition of Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and Powell, section V
outlines the relationship of legal reason to the obligations of judicial restraint.
I.
No organ of American government bears a greater burden of
justification for its own acts than the federal judiciary. The existence of an undemocratic branch of government possessed of vast
powers over democratic enactments has placed the judiciary in an
uneasy posture. Those who would assail an unpopular constitutional decision need only invoke the virtues of popular governance.
The opponents of a judicial ruling, far more than those of a legislative or executive action, may challenge not simply the wisdom, but
the authority and the legitimacy of the act. The attack on a Supreme Court decision is more than on its merits-the assault is on
a form of power whose distance invites popular doubt.
The insulation of the federal judiciary can be sharply contrasted to state judicial systems where democratic retribution remains a real threat. The rejection of three California Supreme
Court Justices in a 1986 retention election underscored the dramatic differences in vulnerability between elected state and
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unelected federal judges." Being unelected means never having to
confront the indignant caller, or answer the anguished letter, or
stand before a sea of unsympathetic faces and explain one's vote.
The contention that life tenure is unimportant would be made, if
at all, only by someone who had never experienced the alternative.
The claim has been made, of course, that the representative
branches of government have themselves become both more distant and less accountable than they once were. Government, at all
levels, it is argued, has grown large, impenetrable, and dependent
on legislative staff and agency bureaucrats whose public accountability is unclear and incomplete. PAC contributions, staff resources, franking privileges and access to the mass media all rest so
disproportionately in the hands of incumbents that the vigor of
electoral challenges may be compromised.9 Paid television spots,
the staple of most contemporary campaigns, have placed candidates behind a shield of professional managers, and have loosened
the bonds between the elected and the electorate.
This assessment of our political health is no doubt a matter of
dispute. Yet, even if one assumes its accuracy, the case for judicial
activism is not strengthened. It is, to say the least, awkward for the
advocates of activism to posit that a lessened measure of legislative
accountability justifies a greater substantive judicial role. 10 For
even a diminished level of political accountability would leave the
judiciary the least responsive branch.
If the incumbents in the other branches have become more removed from the electorate, they are still less so than the members
of the judiciary. Federal judges have tended to come from "the essentially upper-middle-class 'establishment.' ," They have generally been white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant males from economically
comfortable circumstances. 12 And they are lawyers. Justice Frankfurter once observed that "while the judges are swayed by the prevailing beliefs of a particular time, they are also guided by professional opinions and ways of thinking which are, to a certain extent,
' See generally John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the CaliforniaJustices:
The Campaign, the Electorate,and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 Judicature 348
(April-May 1987).
9 See generally Hedrick Smith, The Power Game 122-23 (Random House, 1988).
10 The Supreme Court's decisions broadening the franchise and requiring the reapportionment of state legislatures are procedural responses to attacks upon democratic unaccountability and, as such, raise a different set of questions.
"1 Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents:A PoliticalHistory of Appointments to
the Supreme Court 61 (Oxford, 2d ed 1985).
12See id at 57-62 (discussing the background characteristics of former and present Supreme Court Justices).
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independent of and possibly opposed to the general tone of public
opinion."1 3 It is difficult to envision a change in this circumstance.14 The judiciary, unlike the democratic branches of government, has been open to the members of one profession only, a profession whose strengths may indeed yield independence of mind
but whose powers and privileges have not endeared it to, or even
acquainted it with, the greater number of Americans.
Finally, an erosion of political accountability in the other
branches will not enhance the case for an activist judiciary because
the judiciary's value has historically been affirmed in terms that
are anti-democratic. Admirers and defenders of the courts have
tended to see electoral independence as a virtue, not a defect.
"[C]onstitutional protections would be subject to serious erosion,"
warned Justice Byron White in a 1987 speech to the American Bar
Association, if judges were "compelled or . . .tempted to decide
cases so as to please those who are ... responsible for them being
on the bench." 5
The independence of federal judges is, not coincidentally,
most controversial in times of constitutional ferment. The more
unpopular the judiciary's course, the more significant electoral insulation is to the pursuit of it. This protected status, however, has
been conferred on judges not out of awe but from necessity. Someone must possess the authority to implement the fundamental
mandates of popular governance in the context of unpopular controversies. Yet within this authority lies the power of judges to affect the lives of others without their own jobs being affected-a
power which, were it not so forcefully constrained by constitutional
tradition, would come disturbingly close to being absolute.
The independence of judicial power has historically been of
such importance because of the judiciary's capacity to question the
legitimacy of legislative and executive action. If judges in this
country were confined to reading contracts, the debate over accountability would soon be drained of passion. But any governmental body that defines the powers of other governmental bodies
must possess some fixed idea of the limits of its own. Without this
idea, the democratic balance is distorted, because there is nothing
"3Felix Frankfurter, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary, in Philip B. Kurland, ed, Felix
Frankfurteron the Supreme Court: ExtrajudicialEssays on the Court and the Constitution 4, 5 (Harvard, 1970).
14 But see Arthur S. Miller & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Break the Monopoly of Lawyers on
the Supreme Court, 39 Vand L Rev 305 (1986).
" Ruth Marcus, Justice White Criticizes JudicialElections, Washington Post A5 (Aug
11, 1987).
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more dispiriting than the guardians of the law bending it to suit
their predilections. If the law is less than a "brooding omnipresence in the sky,"16 so also is it more than the preferences of the
men and women who administer the federal judicial system. The
unelected status of judges is not an invitation to stray from democratic mandates as much as a recognition that even the most popular law may need to be applied in unpopular circumstances. Thus
the judge's insulation from electoral politics can be justified, not as
a point of departure from law, but as an aid to evenhanded administration of it.
If we desire the blessings of an unelected judiciary, we also
must accept the burdens of explanation and justification that inevitably accompany it. The legitimacy of judicial power is rarely selfevident: the question "By what authority?" is seldom out of sight.
An innate caution more becomes the judiciary in a democratic system than does habitual assertiveness. And the lack of electoral accountability argues for judicial allegiance to meanings most plainly
extrapolated from statutory and constitutional texts.
I concede the full power of the portrait of an unresponsive and
unrepresentative federal judiciary. I would yet contend that the
concept of judicial accountability is not, at the same time, a simplistic one. A lack of electoral accountability cannot negate the fact
that the judiciary is a coordinate branch of government whose role
is more than one of mere subordination to the other two branches.
It is true that Article III of the Constitution contains no robust list
of enumerated powers comparable to that of Article I, section 8;
but it is likewise true that Article III establishes a separate judicial
branch with careful provision for its independence. What other
dimensions of accountability exist to justify the judicial function
and what role for judges might they portend?
II.
The ways in which judges are accountable are less dramatic
than the ways in which they are not. The dimension of unaccountability in judging (the judge's unelected status) was written
into the Constitution,1 7 while the principles of accountability have
been slower to take shape. The principles of accountability are far
Southern Pacific Co. v Jensen, 244 US 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes dissenting).
17US Const, Art II, § 2 (The President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the supreme Court....."); US Const,
Art III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour ... ").
18
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too infirm a foundation on which to build a case for an activist
judiciary. What they may support is a role that does not drain the
act of judging of all contribution from the judge-an interpretativist role with its own rules of restraint and obligations of fidelity.
In this section, I explore some dimensions of judicial accountability
that seem to me important but ultimately imperfect.
A.
I start with a form of accountability that bears little relationship to judicial philosophy-a judge's accountability for his or her
personal deportment. The Code of Judicial Conduct begins:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to
justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself observe,
high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved .... 18
These words have a wonderfully noble but dreadfully solemn tone,
as though transposed from the gateway of a monastery. They also
capture the essence of public expectations. Their spirit is carried
forward in numerous specific statutes and ethical canons that apply to judicial conduct both on and off the bench. There are financial disclosure
requirements1 9 and statutory directives on when not
20
to sit. The phrase "appearance of impropriety" is ubiquitous.
Judicial conduct, however, may be more a matter of intuition
than of codification. Because judges must maintain a proper judicial demeanor both on and off the bench, they attempt, among
other things, to ensure that the daily dealings of their lives remain
polite. Judges must also submit to a contraction of personal rights
that others may take for granted. While judges may certainly hold
opinions, their freedom to express them is limited by the requirements of the office. 21 Freedom to associate with persons whose
cases may come before the court is circumscribed 2 2 and membership in certain clubs is discouraged, if not forbidden.2 3
Judges may feel nostalgic for the freedom relinquished when
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1 (ABA, 1972).
See, for example, 28 USC Appendix-Judicial Personnel Financial Disclosure Requirements §§ 301-09.
20 See, for example, 28 USC § 455 ("Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate").
'1 Steven Lubet, Judicial Ethics and PrivateLives, 79 Nw U L Rev 983, 1003 (1985).
22 Id at 996 (association with insurance company representatives).
23 Id at 1003. See also Ruth Marcus, Club Memberships: An UnresolvedIssue for Judicial Nominees, Washington Post All (Aug 8, 1988).
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they take the oath. The exuberant joys of political participation
and academic disputation are not easily dismissed. Judge Clement
Haynsworth, a man of exquisite balance, is fond of telling junior
judges on the Fourth Circuit that it is fine to remain interested in
politics, so long as one never tries to influence politics. It is his
gentle way of ushering his colleagues to the upper bleachers. An
appellate courtroom, however, can be a tame substitute for a platform or credentials fight. The week before an election assumes an
unfamiliar air-while partisan feelings run high throughout the
neighborhood, the judge sports a car whose rear bumper reads
"Support Youth Soccer." Impartiality is imperative, however; the
blindfolded woman holding the scales of justice in her hand never
so much as cast a ballot.
Such austerity may lend authority to judicial pronouncements,
but whether the ethical precepts of the judge's life make the judicial branch of government any more accountable to the governed is
problematic. It would be speculative to say that a strict code of
personal accountability translates to political accountability as
well. A judge of unswerving rectitude may yet march to a different
drummer, beyond earshot of democracy, let alone its reach.
In fact, the need for disengagement on the part of federal
judges may place them out of touch. Circumspection breeds isolation. Ironically, the impartiality that we require of judges may
make them less accountable; they are withdrawn from the vox
populae that informs political life. If you want to know what's not
happening, the saying goes, ask a federal judge.
Like much of the debate over judicial accountability, this
point has been somewhat simplified. Even federal judges have
ways of staying in touch, though their windows into the community are no longer political. Trial judges see witnesses and jurors on
a regular basis; many become exceptional observers and listeners.
The judiciary is also the only branch of the federal government
that is largely garrisoned beyond the nation's capital. Lower federal judges, unlike top executive officials or members of Congress,
wake up every morning in their own communities. In the Fourth
Circuit, those communities include Baltimore, Maryland; Abingdon and Charlottesville, Virginia; Charleston and Lewisburg,
West Virginia; Durham and Morganton, North Carolina; Columbia,
Greenville, and Spartanburg, South Carolina. 4 This fact does not
mean that lower federal judges are "in touch," only perhaps that
24

In other circuits, a significant number of appellate judges reside at the seat of court

(for example, Philadelphia, New York, Chicago).
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they are not in danger of losing touch through "Potomac fever."
Nonetheless, the list of "don'ts" in the life of a judge remains
a daunting one: don't solicit funds;25 don't practice law;26 don't
serve as an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary (except for family members).2 To a remarkable extent, the
federal judge is left to draw upon whatever experiences he or she
has accumulated before going on the bench. As all this suggests, it
is difficult to make the case for judicial accountability in terms of a
judge's personal deportment-authority acquired through detachment is not ultimately consonant with the premises of democratic
governance.
B.
It is also difficult to make the case for accountability in terms
of the institutional constraints upon the federal judiciary. These
restraints are well known and need be summarized only briefly.
Courts, it is said, are "counterpunchers," acting only when others
bring a suit.2 8 Judges cannot initiate change. Unlike legislators,
who can reach out to solve a problem, judges are like "'defective
clocks; they have to be shaken to set them going.'" 29 Even when
parties do seek to litigate an issue, the federal courts may be closed
if the case is non-justiciable or a candidate for deferral under, for
example, Pullman abstention 0 or the political question doctrine."
The inability of courts to initiate change also results in their
inability to control it. Since cases are brought by others, and in
response to the individual concerns of the parties, courts cannot
control the "sequencing of innovation 3 2 or devise and implement
a coherent plan of action. They are limited to the portion of a
problem presented by the litigants, and cannot of their own accord
grapple with it in a larger context.3 Abstract claims may conflict
with the requirement of a concrete case and controversy, and risk

Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5(B)(2) (ABA, 1972).
See 28 USC § 454 ("Practice of law by justices and judges.").
17 Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5(D) (ABA, 1972).
" David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 Va L Rev 519, 551
(1988).
", Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy 38 (Brookings, 1977), quoting Lon
L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication 26 (unpublished, 1961).
30 See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v Pullman Co., 312 US 496 (1941).
S See Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486, 518-49 (1969); Baker v Carr, 369 US 186
(1962).
3' Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy 39 (cited in note 29).
33 See Shapiro, 74 Va L Rev at 552 (cited in note 28).
"
16
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the intrusion of particularized judicial power upon the legislative
mandate to devise general solutions to pressing social problems.
Further, judicial remedies are limited. Where legislatures can
use a variety of techniques, such as taxes and subsidies in addition
to simple directives and prohibitions, courts are largely limited to
injunctions. Courts also have limited influence over the effects of
their decisions. The judiciary "must ultimately depend upon the
aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments."- 4
Courts may also be unable to predict the effect of their decisions
on other actors in our system. A controversial decision, for example, may galvanize opposition to a cause.3 5 Lacking any means of
counteracting these effects, judges must attempt to minimize them
in their decisions, and in so doing remain accountable.
Finally, federal appellate courts must, of necessity, accord a
presumption of correctness to someone else, be it Congress, a state
court, a trial judge, an administrative agency, or some other body.
Statutes and regulations by themselves make judges more accountable; they remind judges that their first duty is always to implement the will of another. True, that will is not always self-evident.
The statute's syntax may be bad, its meaning obscure. That, however, merely defines the challenge; a judge's act of faith to Congress remains the tedious, yet curiously satisfying search for legislative intent.
Each of these institutional limits is meant to foster accountability in the form of caution, deference, and restraint. Institutional
restraints should ideally reinforce the profound lesson of Erie, that
the demise of federal common law diminished the role of the federal judge's individual will. Institutional restraints should also
serve as powerful reminders that the courts are susceptible to what
might be termed priestly vulnerabilities and limitations (the latter
not unlike that of the chessboard bishop which can move only diagonally on squares of the same color). In contemplation of these
vulnerabilities and limitations, the judicial branch was long ago
termed the "least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure
them."3

1, Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 464, 465
(Mentor, 1961).
35 See Robert W. Bennett, Judicial Activism and the Concept of OriginalIntent, 69
Judicature 219, 220 (1986).
36 Federalist 78, in FederalistPapers at 465 (cited in note 34). See also Alexander M.
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Yale, 2 ed 1962).
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The problem is that these institutional restraints appeared to
snap in the heady days of judicial activism.3" The political question
doctrine was eroded, 8 the barrier of standing lowered, 39 the exercise of equitable restraint more readily cast aside.4 0 The art of constitutional interpretation appeared to confer upon judges the full
breadth of common law rulemaking powers.4 1 Some of the Warren
Court decisions were salutary (the reapportionment decisions, for
example, revitalized the very democratic process to which judges
must defer). Yet those decisions were achieved at a price. The certiorari power had permitted the Supreme Court to set an agenda,
and once the institutional restraints proved no great obstacle to
the agenda, they were never again to be fully relied upon as brakes
on judicial flight. Although many of the doctrines of restraint enjoyed a resurgence during the 1970's,42 they have not been restored
to their former force. The lesson of the Warren Court has been
that the removal of old institutional restraints and the creation of
new substantive rights went hand-in-glove.
C.
Distinct from this set of institutional constraints are the more
formal instruments by which the judiciary is held accountable
under the Constitution. These are largely unavailing, however, because they are utilized, if at all, only in extremis. It is true, of
course, that federal judges can be impeached, and that they hold
their offices only "during good Behaviour." Relatively few have actually been impeached, however, and only a handful have been
tried or convicted. 43 Impeachment of the President or any civil officer of the United States may proceed upon the commission of a
criminal offense,44 and while the "good Behaviour" standard may
hold judges to a higher account, it is not completely open-ended.
During the attempted impeachment of Justice William 0. Douglas
3' See generally Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colurn L Rev 1 (1964).
18 Baker v Carr,369 US 186 (1962).
9 Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83 (1968).
10 Dombrowski v Pfister, 380 US 479 (1965).
41 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
42 See, for example, Younger v Harris,401 US 37 (1971) (equitable restraint); United
States v Richardson, 418 US 166 (1974) (standing); Gilligan v Morgan, 413 US 1 (1973)
(political question doctrine).
" See David M. O'Brien, Storm Center 97 (Norton, 1986).
" See US Const, Art II, § 4 (providing for impeachment of "[tihe President... and all
civil Officers of the United States" in cases of "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.").
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in 1970, then-Congressman Gerald Ford advanced the argument
that "an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House
of Representatives considers [it] to be at a given moment in history."' "4 But it takes some stretching to equate "good Behaviour"
with popular judgments, and the standards for impeachment have
generally not been so politically interpreted. As a result, the injunction that judges "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour" is not a credible political threat.
The judiciary's relationship with the executive and legislative
branches reveals instruments of accountability that are imperfect
at best. It is true that Supreme Court decisions are subject to "reversal" by statute 6 or constitutional amendment. Such correctives
remind us of the circular nature of our system: every decision is
always appealable to another body. The appointment power allows
the President-and the Senate through advice and consent-to influence the composition and direction of the federal courts. Further, Congress controls the jurisdiction and indeed the very existence of the lower federal courts," and may make exceptions to the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 8 It also funds the operations of the federal courts and sets the salaries and standards of
conduct for the judges. A more subtle lever of Congress's control
over the courts is the power, through the creation of specialized
courts, 49 additional judgeships, 50 and non-Article III courts,5 ' to
regulate the federal judiciary's workload.
The mere enumeration of these means of ensuring judicial accountability may demonstrate the opposite conclusion-that so
long as the judiciary does not unleash a floodtide of public wrath,
it enjoys a remarkable measure of independence. Each of the above
levers of democratic influence over the judiciary possesses a signifiCong Rec, 91st Cong, 2d Sess 11912, 11913 (April 15, 1970) (statement of Rep. Ford).
48

See, for example, Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub L 100-259, 56 USLW 45

(1988).
Sheldon v Sill, 49 US (8 How) 441 (1850).
Ex Parte McCardle, 74 US (7 Wall) 506 (1868).
49 See, for example, The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 96 Stat 25, 37-38,
codified at 28 USC § 1295 (1982) (creating the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and delegating to it exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all federal patent and
trademark cases).
50 Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-486, 92 Stat 1629 (1978) (federal district and circuit judges-additional appointments).
"I See, for example, 28 USC § 151 et seq (1982) (creating federal "Bankruptcy Courts").
There are, of course, constitutional limits on Congressional power to redistribute the business of the federal courts to these courts. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 US 50 (1982) (holding unconstitutional the broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts contained in 28 USC § 1471).
47
48
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cant drawback. The external correctives for judicial excess, for example, all take time; more in the case of a constitutional amendment, less, perhaps, in a statutory "reversal" or in an appointment
of a Supreme Court Justice to shift the philosophical balance on
that Court. Time, however, is something the democratic branches
may not have-a president's term grows only shorter, and public
anguish over a court decision may recede as other matters crowd
the public consciousness and as citizens adjust.
Further, many of these instruments of accountability are subject to their own peculiar limitations. For example, a withdrawal of
federal jurisdiction in a given area of controversy is undesirable for
a very practical reason: some forum must remain to decide the federal question, and state courts may not provide the ideal setting to
interpret statutes and resolve issues of national import. Also, while
the power over appropriations or over creation of specialized tribunals may provide a vehicle for the expression of congressional displeasure with some aspect or other of judicial operations, such
blunt instruments cannot serve as a reliable means of holding particular activist judges to account.
These formal means of response and oversight at the disposal
of democratic branches, if limited, are nonetheless important.
They encourage a fruitful dialogue between the three branches,
and they constitute a distant thunder as the federal judiciary goes
about its work. But one cannot make the case for judicial accountability in these terms any more than one can in terms of a code of
personal judicial conduct, institutional limitations, or doctrinal
constraints. The checks on the exercise of the judicial function-whether intrinsic (e.g., the jurisprudence of justiciability) or
extrinsic (e.g., the impeachment and amendment process)-tend to
be episodic and weak. Indeed, they were designed to be that way,
for only an independent judiciary can carry out its constitutional
duty of enforcing the law even in unpopular circumstances and
even against the other branches of government. A real danger of
judicial activism is that these imperfect checks will be exercised
more frequently, and that the constitutional position of the judiciary will be undermined. For this reason-and out of necessity-the
plea has so often been for judicial self restraint.
D.
The doctrine of judicial self restraint states, quite simply, that
judges should refrain from transporting their personal visions into
law. The doctrine seeks to differentiate judicial tasks from political
ones. It asks the judge to follow Professor Wechsler's famous ex-
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hortation to neutral principles rather than congenial results.2 The
greatest judges have, in fact, been those who paid this icon of their
craft far more than lip service.
At the same time, the history of self restraint has not generally
been a glorious one. It is because of the absence of governmental
self restraint that the Magna Carta was presented to King John at
Runnymede and that almost six centuries later a system of constitutional checks and balances was thought indispensable to our system of government. More bluntly, any human appetite may overcome the feeble defenses the will can mount against it. It is not
irreverent to ask why self restraint is more likely to be successful
for a judge than for a dieter. Left purely to oneself, without the
support and encouragement of spouses, physicians, clinics, and advisory regimens, the dieter's natural appetite may prevail. For
judges, no less than for dieters, it may be more exhilarating simply
to let go. In the name of personal liberty, society permits the dieter
to do so. When the judge jettisons self discipline, however, the rule
of law suffers, and the system of social restraints in which "We the
People" have placed our faith has been ill used.
The various concepts of accountability discussed in this section are not without significance, but they do not make the case for
judicial accountability. Ultimately they seem unsatisfying explanations for the authority granted the judicial branch. Are federal
judges thus unaccountable, at least in relation to the powers that
they exercise? If they are, then the force of a judge's own intellect
and experience has little legitimate role in a decision.
III.
The unaccountable judge is still accountable to reason. A
judge, it is said, must issue reasoned decisions. The judicial system
as a whole is designed to promote reason as the paramount judicial
virtue. To reason, moreover, is to reason from the received postulates of the law, not outside of them. Legal reason represents the
process of applying impersonal principles of law to varying facts.
Thus conceived, reason may chart the course between the subjective dangers of the pragmatic and the ideological. The great danger
of pragmatic judging is that it is divorced from underlying legal
principle; the danger of the ideologic, that it is severed from the
subtleties of real life facts.
1ZHerbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 Harv L Rev
1 (1959).
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This is not to suggest that accountability to reason substitutes
for accountability to the electorate. The judge's accountability to
reason does not render the judge's reasons the equal of those of
elected legislatures. The judge is sworn to interpret faithfully a
statute even when a legislature may arguably be "unreasonable" in
enacting it. In fact, rationality review under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses has been so permissive, 5 and the canons
of statutory construction in connection with plain language so
strict, 54 precisely in order to reduce the power of judicial reason as
an independent political force. The judicial commitment to rationality and logic may not invade a democracy's right to select
"flawed" reasons for its actions so long as they meet with popular
consent.
Still, the federal judiciary does enforce a background requirement of reason for public acts. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do prohibit state action that is arbitrary or capricious; 5 the
basic principles of statutory construction state that the legislature
58
may not be presumed to have done an absurd or useless thing. If
politics blends appeals to the mind and to the heart, the judicial
power is more purely one of persuasion. The promise of an independent judiciary is that it can afford to venture a voice of reason,
and the genius of the constitutional system is that not every step
of judicial reason is an illegitimate act.
The judicial and the political voices must, of course, be differentiated. The political voice is driven by the need to win immediate assent. Judicial persuasion is not addressed to the upcoming
election or to the one beyond, but aspires toward ultimate social
acceptance. Political speech is phrased in terms of pure policy; judicial persuasion in terms of reason as compelled by law. Still, reason itself is ultimately subject to the requirement of political acceptance. The judiciary is permitted to deflect the darker potential
of political movement only to the extent that its powers of reason
eventually win public assent. As Alexander Bickel put it:
5 See, for example, Williamson v Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 US 483 (1955); Railway Express v New York, 336 US 106 (1949).
See, for example, Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 US
102, 108 (1980) (the task in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the will of Congress,
and where this intent has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, "[the] language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.").
55 See, for example, Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539, 558 (1974) ("The touchstone of
due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.").
56Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v Sawhill, 512 F2d 1112, 1118 (Temp
Emergency Ct App 1975). See also United States v Turkette, 452 US 576, 580 (1981).
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The Supreme Court's law... could not in our system prevail.
. . if it ran counter to deeply felt popular needs or convictions,
or even if it was opposed by a determined and substantial minority and received with indifference by the rest of the country. This, in the end, is how and why judicial review is consistent with the theory and practice of political democracy.5
It is important to understand the significance of defining judicial accountability in terms of reason rather than, for example,
"fairness." I do not imply that the reasoning judge is cold and conscienceless, or that the obligation to reason extinguishes the obligation to be fair, compassionate and just. To believe that the contribution of the judiciary is more one of reason than of wisdom is to
recognize its ultimate accountability to the rule of law and its
sworn obligation to translate it faithfully. Reasoning judges are not
always literalists; they are, however, interpretativists who recognize
a collective wisdom in the rule of law far greater than their own.
Perhaps reason has won its place purely by default. How else,
one may ask, is the step from received law to final judgment to be
taken? Judges may rule neither by emotive oratory nor through
stoic silence. They possess neither the moral authority nor the
democratic sanction to rule by fiat. Reason holds at least the hope
that an impersonal process will subdue the temptation to elevate a
personal preference.
To place any faith in the constraining power of judicial reason
may seem foolish. In the name of reason, there has been much rationalization. Reason does not provide an infallible path to right
decisions. One judge's reason may be another's irrationality.
Judges who believe they are faithful to the dictates of reason may
arrive at opposite results. One may surely wonder how accountability is to be derived from a method that allows judges to reach "reasonable," yet conflicting, judgments. The idea, then, that judicial
power is any more legitimate because it aspires to be reasoned is
certain to evoke a skeptical response.
This was not always so. The judicial role as one of reasoned
judgment was once a truism. Today, it is under severe attack. On a
practical level, crowded dockets filled with complex cases threaten
reasoned reflection as never before. On a theoretical level, the legitimacy of reason as a path to judicial judgment has been called
into question. The Critical Legal Studies movement regards judicial reason as mere pretext for the preservation of established pre57 Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 258 (cited in note 36).
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rogatives and rejects the distinction between legal reason and political rhetoric. From a quite different quarter, Judge Robert Bork
has eloquently underscored the potential of any process of subjective thought to subvert the objective dictates of the given law. The
various assaults on legal reasoning underscore the vulnerability of
the judiciary, as the unaccountable branch, to the intrusion of subjectivity. The danger, however, is that these attacks may lead us to
deny the role of reason as a central component of the rule of law.
I am aware that reason itself has fallen into disrepute. After
the Vietnam War and Watergate, official reasoning generally came
to resemble a tool of deception. The mistrust that these events engendered has not spared the law. Since the law itself was viewed as
a malleable commodity, judicial reasoning was seen as open to exploitation by those whose agenda was to preserve the status quo.
To invoke a fidelity to reason in legitimating the judicial function
was to identify the neutrality of logic with the law's oppressive
thrust.
The Critical Legal Studies movement attacks the legitimacy of
the legal system as a whole, defining legal reason as little more
than a rationalization of the preferences of those in power. The
Critical scholars thus deny the determinacy of legal reasoning, as
well as the distinction between legal reason and political dialogue.
"Law is simply politics dressed in different garb;... Legal doctrine
is nothing more than a sophisticated vocabulary and repertoire of
manipulative techniques for categorizing, describing, organizing,
and comparing; it is not a methodology for reaching substantive
outcomes."' 8 Although the Critical Legal Studies movement is
more subtle than this brief summary suggests, its depth of disenchantment is accurately recorded. As Professor Kennedy has
stated, "Legal thought can generate equally plausible... justifications for almost any result." 59 The relationship between Critical
Legal Scholars and literary deconstructionists has been close."0 If
legal texts, like literary texts, lack rational determinacy, then
"'Allan C. Hutchinson and Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the CriticalLegal
Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 Stan L Rev 199, 206 (1984)
(emphasis in original). See also Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship:Its Causes and Cure, 90
Yale L J 1205, 1206 (1981). But see Christopher D. Stone, From a LanguagePerspective, 90
Yale L J 1149, 1166-68 (1981) (maintaining that legal reasoning is "special" and separate
from political debate).
I" Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in David Kairys, ed,
The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 40, 48 (Pantheon, 1982).
'0 See generally J. M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practiceand Legal Theory, 96 Yale L J
743 (1987) (relating the deconstructionism of Jacques Derrida to interpretation of legal
texts).
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judges are more easily exposed as protectors of privilege and
power, not the oracles of neutral law.
Ironically, proponents of judicial restraint have also called into
question the ability of judges to reason objectively. Once this ability is doubted, judicial accountability to law, and to democracy,
becomes attenuated; judicial reasoning may be seen as a ready
smokescreen for judicial activism. Reason, in fact, is a tool all too
readily co-opted by educated elites, in this case activist judges." It
is only a short hop from the reasoning judge to the "wise" judge; in
fact, the line between the two may be so difficult to draw that faith
must be placed not in the human frailty and idiosyncrasy of judicial reason, but in the sturdy corpus of law. Judge Robert Bork,
drawing in part upon the powerful legacy of Justice Hugo Black,
has argued that legal reason is no substitute for literal fidelity to
legal texts. Judge Bork has argued that where "constitutional
materials do not clearly specify the value to be preferred, there is
no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any
other." 2 Interpretation of constitutional clauses is to be defined by
the intent of the framers, not the reasons of the judge. A system of
moral or ethical values "without objective or intrinsic validity"63 is
irreconcilable with that intent. Invariably, the search for another's
intent must take precedence over the judge's own reason.
These opposing assaults have placed the historic justification
for judicial acts at risk. If the process of judicial reason represents,
on the one hand, an act of hierarchical oppression or, on the other,
a departure from the rule of law, then the legitimacy of the judiciary's interpretative function is in doubt. Or, to put it another way,
if these critiques are correct, the only acceptable role for a judge in
a democratic society would be the most formalistic, bringing to
bear upon a case as little independent force of intellect as possible.
Yet the judge's accountability to reason is not distinct and
apart from the judge's accountability to law. Reason is but an ingredient in the interpretation of law. To recognize this is to rescue
the judicial function from parrotry, but it is not to set the judge
above the law. If Bork's contribution is in building upon the foundations of Black's literalism a philosophy of intentionalism, the
question nonetheless remains: What exactly is the judicial role

"2Robert H. Bork, The Struggle Over the Role of the Court, 34 National Review 37
(Sept 17, 1982).
02 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,47 Ind L
J 1, 8 (1971). See also Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary (Harvard, 1977).
"' Bork, 47 Ind L J at 10 (cited in note 62).
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when the lawmaker's intent is obscure? To support judicial reason
is to recognize that the law often does not come equipped with
marching orders. Lawsuits frequently involve an amalgam of statutes with strange voids and contradictions, precedents whose arrows point in opposite directions, facts that elude and confuse, and
propositions about human nature on which no two people would
agree. All this complexity gives the judge no right to indulge a
preference; rather it imposes the obligation to reason, and it affords the opportunity to legitimate with logic the inchoate expressions of the given law.
Insisting that the interpretativist act of reason cannot constitute a task for judges is not only unrealistic; ultimately, it denies
the value that the legal profession has historically used to define
itself and its special contribution to the social order. From the beginning of law school, students sense that reason and analysis are
sustaining professional values. A special premium is placed upon
these skills, not simply as a matter of socratic gamesmanship, but
because these skills are among the most valued in the workplace,
whether that workplace is the law firm, the courtroom, or the classroom. The term "legal reasoning" represents the profession's attempt to differentiate its own process of thought from that of other
disciplines. Yet legal reasoning is no occult art, but variations on a
single question: Does principle A apply to fact B? 4 If such reasoning were an end in itself, legal training would be an empty exercise,
stimulating, perhaps, but pointlessly so.
The law's faith in reason must represent something moie. Reasoning is a proxy for other values and preferences: order over
chaos, evolution over revolution, thought over passion, prolonged
argumentation over precipitate action. These, I would argue, are
values the federal judiciary should respect-not because judges are
pillars of the present power structure, but because the process of
change has been constitutionally established, and because change
and the power of rhetoric to achieve change are generally the province of the political branches of government.
As a law professor, I would meet students who were dismayed
that the legal profession had sought to define itself in terms of a
process, however worthwhile the process might appear to be. Why,
they would ask, is not the paramount professional value helping
the less fortunate among us or achieving international peace or any
number of ecumenical ends on which people could agree? The
61 See the disarming acknowledgement to this effect in Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 Mich L Rev 827, 858-9 (1988).
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problem is that while a consensus might exist as to those ends, no
consensus would ever be reached on the best means to achieve
them. What individual lawyers may do is, of course, a matter of
preference, choice, and personal conviction. The most the profession as a whole can attempt is to establish the process by which
inescapably divergent views on intractably hard questions can be
ventilated. Inevitably, this process values that which lawyers profess to do best: argumentation, analysis, and critical reasoning.
IV.
Reason, not surprisingly, defines the federal judicial system.
Three judicial practices in particular serve to reinforce the primacy
of reason-the duty to explain, the threat of reversal, and the tradition of dissent. Each exposes the reasoning of the individual
judge. Nothing in the Constitution requires the written justification of judicial decisions, but a judiciary accountable to reason
cannot resort to arbitrary acts. As Judge Frank Coffin puts it,
"[t]he act of writing tells us what was wrong with the act of thinking." 65 The danger is that this duty of exposition can be evaded. It
requires candor from judges in addressing the strongest arguments
against their own views. It requires that crowded dockets not generate too many summary dispositions. Finally, it requires that the
reasoning process not begin anew with each decision: while a legislator is always free to break with the past, a judge must respect
precedent to prove "that law binds judges along with the rest of us
and judicial decisions are not simply the constantly varying assessments of constantly varying judicial personalities. '66 The duty of
exposition seeks to remind the judge that the power to do something is not the same as the right to do it-that right can be
earned, if at all, through reason.
Other practices within the federal system also point to the
dominant role of reason. A dissent, of course, helps "keep[] the
majority accountable for the rationale and consequences of its decision. "67 But there are other ways in which a federal judge is answerable for his or her analysis. The reasoning of a single appellate
judge, for example, has no operative effect. In the federal circuit
courts, it takes at least two to decide, and in the Supreme Court, it
takes a committee of five. Such simple arithmetic encourages rea" Frank M. Coffin, The Ways of a Judge: Reflections From the Federal Appellate
Bench 57 (Houghton, Mifflin, 1980).
" Paul Gewirtz, Reverse Discrimination,The New Republic 13 (Oct 24, 1988).
67 William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 Hastings L J 427, 430 (1986).
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soning in a collegial rather than a solitary setting; even the solitary
reflections of the judge are framed by the consideration that others
must be persuaded. The collegial aspects of reason can be further
expanded. In the Fourth Circuit, proposed opinions are circulated
for comment not only amongst the three panel members, but to
every member of the circuit. The fact that a non-panel judge has
no vote on the case has proved no impediment to criticism. It is
not unusual to have a dozen letters debating a particular point of
controversy within the court. All of us pay homage to this relentless criticism of our reasoning-in retrospect. At the time, it is
tempting to say to a tenacious colleague, "Spare me your reasons;
just tell me your vote."
The reasoning of district and circuit judges is under vertical as
well as lateral assault. It is fair to question the efficacy of reversal
as a sanction, but judges, like anyone else, find it more satisfying
to have their analyses agreed with and affirmed. One might argue
that reversals exist to promote discipline within the federal system
and that, if anything, they tend to discourage rigorous thought. It
is also true, as district judges are fond of reminding circuit judges,
that the last word is not always the most reasoned one. But the
justification for appeals is not necessarily the "correct" result they
may produce, but their tendency to encourage reasoned judgment
by subjecting it to reexamination. That, at least, was the theory of
the Evarts Act of 1891 which created the courts of appeals. 8
Power often stems from force; influence from persuasion.
Since the judiciary lacks the former, it must rely on the latter. Judicial performance ought to be scrutinized as a persuasive rendering of law. Judge Posner has spoken of "the threat of searing professional criticism" as "an effective check on irresponsible judicial
actions. ' ' 69 Academic criticism bears something of the same relationship to the judicial branch that journalistic criticism bears to
the political branches. If academic criticism is less public, it is
more analytic and thus addresses the judicial branch on its own
terms. The public response to a decision may turn more on its result than on its reasoning. If strict adherence to standards is to be
an element of judicial accountability, a professional as well as a
political yardstick of performance will be necessary.
None of this elaborate process guarantees that judicial decisions will be objective acts. Yet those who discount the objectivity
of reason are left with even more subjective alternatives in its
'8 Act of March 3, 1891, ch 517, 26 Stat 826.
49 Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 229 (Harvard, 1985).
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place. The two current attacks on legal reason-deconstructionism
and literalism-both end by conceding to the judiciary the very
power that they seek to displace. Regarding deconstructionism,
Professor Fiss argues that:
The law aspires to objectivity, so the nihilist observes, but he
concludes that the nature of the constitutional text makes this
impossible. The text is capable of any number of possible
meanings, and thus it is impossible to speak of one interpretation as true and the other false .... For the deconstructionist,
it makes little difference whether a text is viewed as holding
all meanings or no meaning: Either brand of nihilism liberates
the critic as meaning-creator."0
Unlike the deconstructionist, the literalist professes to find determinate meanings in the constitutional text and downplays the
role of reason in the interpretative process. To the deconstructionist, the text means little; to the literalist it means everything. Like
the deconstructionist, however, the literalist ironically cedes to
judges the very latitude that the duty of reason is designed to restrict. The illusion of literal answers, wrote Professor Bickel,
gives [judges] a great sense of freedom, it induces a happy activism without afterthought and sometimes even without forethought; in short, it lightens the load of personal and institutional responsibility. But behind the screen of the illusion,
thus embraced, will operate-and operate less deliberately
than they should-the judge's own convictions.
The idea of judicial accountability to reason still leaves unanswered questions. The first is: What are the tools and implements
of judicial reason? The second is: Given the unelected and unaccountable dimension of the judicial power, is there any inherent
correlation, as there must be, between reason and restraint?
Professor Fiss has argued that judicial reason can retain its
objectivity: there are "disciplining rules, which constrain the interpreter and constitute the standards by which the correctness of the
interpretation is to be judged; . . . [there is also] an interpretive
community, which recognizes these rules as authoritative. ' '72 Professor Fiss errs, however, in suggesting that the tools of interpretation are the cosmic constitutional values-"equality, liberty, prop70 Fiss, 34 Stan L Rev at 742 and 762 (cited in note 6).
71 Bickel, The Least DangerousBranch 97 (cited in note 36).
72 Fiss, 34 Stan L Rev at 744 (cited in note 6).
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erty, due process," as adapted to "the prevailing morality. ' 73 To
claim so spacious a mandate for judicial interpretation is to confirm the fears of its detractors: that judicial reason has no foundation in objectivity or restraint.
I am not suggesting that the general language of the great constitutional clauses permits judges to strip them of effect. The
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses must mean something,
and the fear that some judges may abuse them does not permit
others to aver they have no use. Does not the Constitution permit
differences of degree? There is a difference, for example, between
holding that constitutional equality condemns discrimination
against suspect classes and that it embraces a bill of fundamental
economic rights. There is a difference too between voiding the intrusion on familial institutions posed by the aberrational state law
in Griswold v Connecticut74 and embarking upon an ambitious expansion of the privacy concept.
Are such differences of constitutional degree in the end only
differences of pragmatism and expediency? Or do they enjoy some
principled foundation in the role of judicial reason? In the final
section of this essay, I will argue that they do enjoy a principled
foundation. Both the unaccountable status of federal judges and
the structural mandates of federalism and separation of powers together accord a presumption of correctness to democratic enactments. I will attempt to show that Justices Frankfurter, the second
Justice Harlan, and Justice Powell preserved the principles of both
reason and restraint in finding that the powerful presumption of
democratic legitimacy was, nonetheless, still less than absolute.
V.
The recent debate over constitutional adjudication has been
polarized. Some view the Constitution as an "empty vessel" into
which judges must pour content. 75 This content is thought to come
from "moral leadership" or "prophecy, 76 the "fusion of constitutional law and moral theory, '77 or a "higher law" of "natural
rights. '7 8 None of these sources of content, however, sufficiently
71 Id
74

at 753.
381 US 479 (1965).

75 Arthur Selwyn Miller, Toward Increased Judicial Activism: The Political Role of
the Supreme Court 23 (Greenwood, 1982).
76 Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights: An Inquiry Into
the Legitimacy of ConstitutionalPolicymaking by the Judiciary98-99 (Yale, 1982).
7 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 149 (Harvard, 1977).
78 Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 Stan L Rev 703, 715
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accounts for the ways in which judges themselves are unaccountable, and each offers judges too much chance to indulge their personal beliefs.7 9
Others contend that the Constitution has established "explicit
rules as to how the great issues of every age should be decided."8 0
The answer to whether a judge is acting properly is "found by
looking at the relevant written constitutional provision and checking to see if it is being enforced according to its plain words as
originally understood."" According to this view, the Constitution
constrains judges to "interpret the document's words according to
the intentions of those who drafted, proposed,
and ratified its pro8' 2
visions and its various amendments.
Neither of these views has fully taken into account the implications of judicial accountability to reason. The judicial covenant
with reason has a paradoxical effect upon the role of the judge.
While it limits the indulgence of personal preference, it enlarges
the legal context from which the judge must draw. It underscores a
tension that the polar positions in the constitutional debate have
managed to obscure: that a constitution may at the same time provide few answers and impose serious constraints. Those constraints
lie, however, as much in the document's structural principles as in
its literal text, as much in the unaccountable status of judges as in
the Framers' intentions.
This tension harkens back to the great debates between Justices Black and Harlan, both of whom regarded themselves as
practitioners of restraint. Justice Black was a consummate literalist who found answers in the clear commands of the constitutional
text. Harlan relied on the larger constitutional principles of separation of powers and our system of federalism. Respect for these
principles, Justice Harlan believed, would "go farther toward keeping judges from roaming at large in the constitutional field"8' 3 than
the illusory specificity of the Bill of Rights.
It is important to recognize that Judge Bork and Justice
Harlan also represent distinct schools of restraintist thought. The

(1975).
7' See Berger, Government by Judiciary4 (cited in note 62).
SO Edwin Meese, III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 Harv J L & Pub
Pol 5, 7 (1988).
81 Id at 10.
2 Robert H. Bork, Remarks Before the University of San Diego Law School (Nov 18,
1985), quoted in Alex Kozinski & J. D. Williams, It is a Constitution We Are Expounding:
A Debate, 1987 Utah L Rev 977, 986.
83 Griswold, 381 US at 502 (Harlan concurring in the judgment).
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great strength of the Bork school is its insistence upon external
standards, standards extrinsic to the judges themselves. Its contribution has been to place a heavy burden of justification upon
courts that seek to pursue an activist course. Its deficiencies, on
the other hand, lie in the assumption that external standards will
always yield answers, and in the suggestion that intentionalism or
originalism leaves little for the judge to do but look.
The Harlan school shares with the Bork school the fundamental premise of restraint. Its chief sources of restraint, however,
have been the constitutional principles of federalism and separation of powers. Federalism and separation of powers provide a
powerful presumption of democratic legitimacy but not a definitive
answer to every constitutional dilemma. The Harlan school holds
that there remains a role for reason within the rule of law.
This view is represented not only in the work of Justice
Harlan, but in that of Justices Frankfurter before him and Powell
afterward. Frankfurter, more self conscious than Harlan or Powell,
fretted frequently about the source of his decisions. To him, the
idea of literal answers leaving no room for judicial insight was a
mirage. The lack of definite answers, however, left the Justice uncertain whether his was the voice of legal reason or idiosyncratic
preference. Frankfurter warned against enforcing "individual views
instead of speaking humbly as the voice of the law by which society presumably consents to be ruled."8' 4 He sought to adopt a "philosophy of intellectual humility" in approaching cases,8 5 and he
strove to avoid "confounding the familiar with the necessary"8
and the "unwise" with the unconstitutional 7 Personal preferences
were not to be confused with constitutional mandates:
Were my purely personal attitudes relevant I should wholeheartedly associate myself with the general libertarian views
in the Court's opinion, representing as they do the thought
and action of a lifetime .... As a member of this Court, I am
not justified in writing my private notions of policy into the
Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish them or

84

Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U Pa L Rev

781, 794 (1957).
"I Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, in Archibald MacLeish and E. F. Pritchard, Jr., eds, Law and Politics: Occasional Papers of Felix Frankfurter (1913-1938) 122 (Harcourt, Brace, 1939).
" Felix Frankfurter, Justice Holmes Defines the Constitution, in Law and Politics at
67 (paraphrasing Tocqueville) (cited in note 85).
87 Dennis v United States, 341 US 494, 552 (1951) (Frankfurter concurring).
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how mischievous I may deem their disregard. 88
The turmoil into which Frankfurter threw himself was quite
intense. "There are times," he wrote, "I can assure you-more
than once or twice-when I sit in this chair and wonder whether
[judging] isn't too great a power to give to any nine men, no matter
how wise, how well disciplined, how disinterested. It covers the
whole gamut of political, social and economic activities."8 9
All this articulation of one's own anguish may strike some as
an unnecessary expenditure of energy. On the other hand, Justice
Frankfurter got one point profoundly right. The business of judging cannot be made easy, because clear answers cannot always be
laid out. There is a role for judicial reason. Yet the duty to make
great choices carries with it the temptation to formulate wise policy. How then might the obligation to reason be accommodated to
the imperative of restraint?
The accommodation derives in part from the fact that the
structural premises from which Frankfurter, Harlan, and Powell
reasoned have a constitutional origin. The careful distribution of
power into three distinct departments and the explicit checks of
each department on the other are means by which the virtues of
republican government can be achieved.9 0 In fact, "[n]o political
truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the
authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty."9 ' The organizing
principle of the Constitution, so plain as to escape reflection, is to
devote one of the first three articles to each separate branch.
The constitutional structure also embodies a division of power
between a federal government with limited powers and states with
the residuum. At the time of constitutional creation, the states retained "all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and
which were not ... exclusively delegated to the United States."9 2
Under the constitutional system of federalism, the States, in all
"unenumerated cases," retained "their sovereign and independent
jurisdiction."9 3 Those powers that were delegated were "few and
" West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 646-47 (Frankfuter
dissenting).
1,Felix Frankfurter, Federalism and the Role of the Supreme Court, in Philip B. Kurland, ed, Of Law and Life and Other Things that Matter: Papers and Addresses of Felix
Frankfurter 129 (Harvard, 1965).
90 Federalist 9 (Hamilton), in FederalistPapers at 71, 72-73 (cited in note 34).
91 Federalist 47 (Madison), in id at 300, 301.
11 Federalist 32 (Hamilton), in id at 197, 198. See also Federalist 39 (Madison), in id at
240.
13

Federalist 40 (Madison), in id at 247, 251.
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'
defined"; those that remained were "numerous and indefinite."94
Despite assurances from the Framers that the federal government
could exercise only those powers expressly delegated to it, the
Tenth Amendment was added to the Constitution "to put the obvious beyond peradventure."9 5 Constitutional liberty was as much
a matter of the dispersion of governmental power as the enumeration of individual rights. As Justice Harlan explained:

Our federal system, though born of the necessity of achieving
union, has proved to be a bulwark of freedom as well. We are
accustomed to speak of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment as the principal guarantees of personal liberty.
Yet it would surely be shallow not to recognize that the structure of our political system accounts no less for the free society we have. Indeed, it was upon the structure of government
that the founders primarily focused in writing the Constitution. Out of bitter experience they were suspicious of every
form of all-powerful central authority and they sought to assure that such a government would never exist in this country
by structuring the federal establishment so as to diffuse power
between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The
diffusion of power between federal and state authority serves
the same ends and takes on added significance
as the size of
96
the federal bureaucracy continues to grow.

Nevertheless, these structural postulates of the Constitution
are premises only. They do not absolve judges of the obligation to
reason. Nor do they answer whether a particular exercise of political power is lawful. Federalism and separation of powers suggest
an answer by creating a presumption, a presumption that the federal judicial power should grant state legislative power maximum
room to maneuver. But Harlan believed that this presumption
could be overcome. In Poe v Ullman9 7 and Griswold v Connecticut, 8 Harlan argued that the State could not "enforce its moral
judgment by intruding upon the most intimate details of the marital relation with the full power of the criminal law." 99 In overcom" Federalist 45 (Madison), in id at 288, 292.
Raoul Berger, Federalism: The Founders' Design 80 (U Okla, 1987).
" John M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication:Keeping the Judicial Function in Bal-

95

ance, 49 ABA J 943, 943-44 (1963).
97 367 US 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan dissenting).
98 381 US 479, 499 (1964) (Harlan concurring in the judgment).
" Poe, 367 US at 548 (Harlan dissenting); see also Griswold, 381 US at 500 (Harlan
concurring in the judgment) (referring to the reasons stated in his Poe dissent).
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ing the presumption of restraint, the Harlan opinions in Poe and
Griswold did not reject the role of reason. In their recognition of
the boundaries of judicial power, in their search for a limiting principle of intervention, in their quest for rulings grounded in familial
institutions and traditions, these opinions, whatever their shortcomings, are not examples of an indiscriminate exercise of judicial
power.
If Justice Harlan's opinions in Poe and Griswold confirm that
the structural principles of the Constitution do not relieve judges
of their responsibility to reason, they also suggest that there is no
invariable link between those principles and restraint. The principles of federalism and separation of powers do suggest, however,
that the instances of intervention should be few in number and
limited in scope. Nonetheless, reasoning from these structural
principles does not "obviate all constitutional differences of opinion among judges, nor should it."' 10 0 Nowhere is this more apparent
that when the structural principles themselves collide.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in National League of Cities v
Usery,10 1 Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Garcia v San
0 and Justice
Antonio Metro. Transit Authority,"'
Scalia's dissent03
ing opinion in Morrison v Olson' illustrate the occasional reluctance on the part of Justices prominently associated with restraint
to defer to congressional judgments. In National League of Cities,
the Court, per Justice Rehnquist, refused to allow Congress to impose minimum wage and maximum hour standards directly on the
states or their various political subdivisions, even though Congress
was exercising its otherwise "plenary power" to regulate commerce. 10 4 In Garcia,Justice Powell warned in dissent that the majority's decision to overrule National League of Cities would reduce the Tenth Amendment to "meaningless rhetoric" whenever
Congress acts pursuant to its commerce power.' °5 In Morrison, Justice Scalia dissented from the Court's upholding the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 because he feared, among other things, the "fragmentation of execu06
tive power."'
It can be argued that in these cases Justices Rehnquist, PowGriswold, 381 US at 501 (Harlan concurring in the judgment).
426 US 833 (1976).
102 469 US 528, 557 (1985) (Powell dissenting).
1o3 108 S Ct 2597, 2622 (1988) (Scalia dissenting).
100
101

104

426 US at 842.

105 469 US at 560.
100 108 S Ct at 2641.
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ell, and Scalia were pursuing an activist course in urging the unconstitutionality of congressional action. However, the framework
of the arguments merits careful observance. Rehnquist, Powell,
and Scalia were defending the very structural principles that
Frankfurter and Harlan had earlier championed. The National
League of Cities majority and the Garcia dissent claimed that the
legislative judgment had undermined the constitutionally mandated balance of power between the federal government and the
States. In the Morrison dissent, the legislative judgment was alleged to undermine not only the constitutionally mandated doctrine of separation of powers, but the political accountability of the
executive itself. The great cautionary note, of course, is that federal antitrust laws, 0 7 child labor laws, 10 8 and much New Deal legislation 0 9 had also been set aside in the name of this same fidelity to
our federal system of government. The question still remains,
therefore, whether reasoning from the structural postulates of the
Constitution bears any inherent connection to judicial restraint.
The application of structural principles has for the most part
resulted in the exercise of restraint. The case of Justice Powell is
illustrative. His commitment to separation of powers made him reluctant to read private rights of action into statutes or to reduce
requirements of standing that would thrust courts into "abstract
questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions.""10 In San Antonio School District v Rodriguez, where the
Court rejected a constitutional challenge to Texas's system of public school finance, Powell returned to Justice Brandeis's famous
maxim that each state in our federal system is free to "'serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments.',"'
More pragmatic than Frankfurter or Harlan, Powell often justified
judicial deference in terms of a lack of judicial experience-" [w]e
have relied for generations upon the experience, good faith and
dedication of those who staff our public schools.""' 2 It was as
though the general grant of federal question jurisdiction and the
infinite variety of judicial dockets deprived the courts of the exper107 United States v E. C. Knight Co., 156 US 1 (1895).
108 Hammer v Dagenhart, 247 US 251 (1918).
109
11

For example, Carter v Carter Coal Co., 298 US 238 (1936).
Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 500 (1975). See also Cannon v University of Chicago,

441 US 677, 742 (1979) (Powell dissenting).
" 411 US 1, 50 (1973) (quoting New State Ice Co. v Liebmann, 285 US 262, 280, 311
(1932) (Brandeis dissenting)).
"' Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565, 595 (1975) (Powell dissenting).
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tise belonging to a committee of Congress or an executive department. Similarly, the remoteness of the Supreme Court deprived it
of the hands-on experience of state and local officials. Not only
school officials,"' but also prosecutors," 4 police," 5 state trial
judges, 1 6 military authorities,"" and welfare workers" 8 enjoyed
considerable freedom in their fields of expertise. As with Harlan,
the deference Powell accorded democratic processes was not absolute. 119 But Powell's commitment to a devolution of authority led
him to abjure flat declarations of principle in favor of a presumptive reliance on the structural principles that acknowledged the respective spheres of Congress and the states. Like Frankfurter and
Harlan, Powell's solutions to the great constitutional dilemmas
were more suggested than compelled; the language of the document did not absolve the Justice from applying the structural principles within it.
That the structural principles of separation of powers and federalism do most often result in restraint does not necessarily prove
that they should. I believe that they should, however, primarily because of the arguments advanced in the earlier sections of this essay. The federal judiciary is not generally accountable for its actions, and many of the explanations offered on behalf of its
accountability seem to me unsatisfactory. Accountability to reason
is among the most promising gifts the legal profession has to offer,
but in the end even this gift is no guarantee of objectivity or
justice.
One is left, as always, with human imperfection and those who
strive to make the most of it. The three Justices I have described
did not abdicate their role of reason nor did they abandon their
obligation of restraint. None of the three were activists, yet neither
were they literalists. Their judicial vision was simultaneously one
of breadth and one of limits. Limiting, because their philosophy
had its taproots in the structural constraints of constitutional law.
Broadening, because that same law had failed to leave an infallible
blueprint, and a reasoned interpretation by the Justice was still
essential. To some, that interpretation will always seem subjective.
113 Id at 584 (Powell dissenting); San Antonio Independent School District v Rodri-

guez, 411 US 1 (1973).
1 Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409 (1976).
115 Neil v Biggers, 409 US 188 (1972).
" Ristaino v Ross, 424 US 589 (1976).
117 Greer v Spock, 424 US 828, 842 (1976) (Powell concurring).
118 Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319 (1976).
119 See, for example, Moore v East Cleveland, 431 US 494 (1977).
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To Frankfurter, Harlan, and Powell it did not appear so. Theirs
was a reason coupled with a remonstrance toward impatience, a
belief that slow solutions, democratically achieved, were worth the
wait. To them, what today might meet with derision still seemed
possible: that judges might employ their own faculties of reason
and yet retain their integrity as servants of another's will.

